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The Mathew 0. Tobriner
Memorial Lecture
Justice Clarence Thomas in Retrospect
by
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.*
First of all, I want to congratulate the members of the Tobriner
family for the significant contributions they have made in bringing
scholars and practitioners to this distinguished series of lectures. In
view of his extraordinary intellectual breadth, there can be no greater
tribute to Chief Justice Tobriner than for lecturers to raise provocative
issues so that their views can be challenged and evaluated in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. In recognition of the Tobriner legacy of encourag-
ing a great university to welcome robust debate, I have prepared this
lecture. However, before starting, I want to congratulate your new
dean, Mary Kay Kane, on her appointment. She exemplifies your
school's long-standing tradition of excellence. I must also note that
there is a special joy in being introduced by my longtime friend and
colleague, Chief Judge Thelton Henderson. I still have fond memories
of our experiences in South Africa in 1982. At another time I trust
that he and I can share with you the visions, the drama, and the chal-
lenges that inspired us during our thirteen-year relationship in our ef-
forts to help move South Africa towards democracy.'
* © Copyright A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Chief Judge Emeritus of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (retired); Public Service Professor of Juris-
prudence, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Of Counsel to
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. This Article is a revised version of Judge Hig-
ginbotham's Tobriner Lecture given January 12, 1994 at the University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law. Judge Higginbotham limits his comments to events and cases
that occurred prior to the date of the Lecture.
I would like to acknowledge the substantial research assistance of Aderson B. Fran-
cois, Esq., and Rubin M. Sinins in the preparation of this Article.
1. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The Ameri-
can Experience and the South African Challenge, 42 DUKE L.J. 1028 (1993); A. Leon Hig-
ginbotham, Jr., et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africt.
The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL L. REv. 763 (1991); A. Leon Higgin-
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This afternoon I speak about a topic that is in some ways painful
to me. Nevertheless, I think it is of great importance in revealing dif-
ferent perceptions of the role of the Supreme Court and different per-
ceptions as to the insights African-Americans can glean from their
culture and the historical experiences of their people.
It is appropriate to focus on the topic of "Justice Clarence
Thomas in Retrospect" because it is now more than two years since
then-President George Bush, at Kennebunkport, Maine, advised the
American public that Clarence Thomas was the "best person for [the]
position ' 2 of Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Now, after all of the hurrahs, all of the critiques, all of the heartaches,
and all of the agony, serious scholars must attempt to put those events
of the last thirty months pertaining to Justice Clarence Thomas into a
broader perspective.
It was George Santayana who once said, "Those who cannot re-
member the past are condemned to repeat it."' 3 If, as a nation, we are
going to deal with the enormous challenges of the present, if we are
going to attempt to maximize our options for the future, this lecture
series is an appropriate forum to ask: Are there insightful lessons that
we can learn from the controversial nomination of Clarence Thomas;
what were the historical political perspectives, values, and priorities
that were so intricately involved in his nomination; and how has he
thus far performed as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court?4
botham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 479 (1990). See also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Introduction to WIL-
LIAM J. BUTLER ET AL., THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA-THE DAWN OF DEMOCRACY: REPORT
OF A MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS AND THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 5 (1994).
2. The Supreme Court; Excerpts From News Conference Announcing Court Nomi-
nee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A14 (statement of President Bush).
3. GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF REASON 289 (1905).
4. For my more detailed analysis of Justice Thomas's performance in voting rights
and cruel and unusual punishment cases, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., et al., Shaw v.
Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FOROHAM
L. REV. 1593 (1994). See also id. at 1645 n.247 ("Of the disheartening factors in Shaw v.
Reno, none is more so than the decisive vote of Justice Clarence Thomas-who succeeded
Thurgood Marshall-in favor of the 5-4 decision. It is inconceivable that Justice Thurgood
Marshall would have so interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, risking a significant set-
back to African-Americans' recent political progress."); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Justice
Marshall's 'Conversation' with Justice Thomas on the Eighth Amendment, 68 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv (forthcoming 1994).
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L The Nomination of Justice Thomas
Upon the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the United States
Supreme Court, many Americans, and particularly African-Ameri-
cans, were confronted with intensely emotional and divisive issues.
As an example, consider the National Bar Association (NBA), the
premier organization of African-American lawyers. While Clarence
Thomas's nomination was pending in August 1991, the NBA was
meeting at its Annual Convention in Indianapolis. After three days of
intense debate and deliberations and unenthusiastic recommendations
as to his nomination by both the Judicial Selection Committee and the
Executive Committee, the general body voted 128 to oppose, 124 to
support, and 31 took "no position."5
It was a significant event when the national delegates of the pre-
mier professional bar association of African-Americans, dedicated to
the concept of advancing Black lawyers into positions of power, were
so doubtful of Clarence Thomas's worthiness that they would not give
a majority vote in favor of his nomination to the United States
Supreme Court. Sharon McPhail, then the president of the NBA,
summed up her frustrations by asking: "Will the real Clarence
Thomas please stand up?" She pondered: "Is Clarence Thomas a
'conservative with a common touch' as Ruth Marcus [of the Washing-
ton Post] refers to him... or [is he] the 'counterfeit hero' he is accused
of being by Hayward BuMs," 6 the distinguished dean of CUNY Law
School, who also is an African-American, who also is a Yale graduate,
and who has known Clarence Thomas for many years?
One writer in the October 1991 National Bar Association Maga-
zine observed: "While his strongest supporters are confident that he
will be confirmed, his critics accuse him of forgetting where he came
from." 7
During the last two years, I have been involved in a multifaceted
research project on Justice Thomas and his impact on the Supreme
Court. The first step was to explain why I wrote my Open Letter to
Justice Clarence Thomas,8 and the second was to evaluate the signifi-
cance of the public response to that letter.
5. Monique M. Sadler, Clarence Thomas-the Right Man at the Right Time?, NAT'L
B. AsS'N MAG., Oct. 1991, at 8.
6. Sharon McPhail, Will The Real Clarence Thomas Please Stand Up?, NAT'L B.
ASS'N MAG., Oct. 1991, at 1.
7. Sadler, supra note 5.
8. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a
Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1005 (1992).
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Though in my research I am considering many additional aspects
of Clarence Thomas's nomination and his impact on the Supreme
Court, for this lecture I will focus primarily on the reasons I wrote the
Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas and the public response to my
letter. I also will put my remarks in context by discussing my personal
reactions both at Justice Thurgood Marshall's funeral and, later, as a
member of the Supreme Court's Bar Committee, which presented a
resolution to the Supreme Court as a tribute to Justice Marshall.9 Im-
plicit in my comments will be my views as to whether Justice Thomas's
critics were correct in accusing him of "forgetting where he came
from."
II. Why I Wrote and Published the Letter to Justice Thomas
During the entire nomination and confirmation process involving
Clarence Thomas, I made no public statement either supporting or
criticizing his nomination. I was then sitting as a federal judge, and I
did not want to make any personal statement that would be consid-
ered inappropriate, or distorted by the media, or misunderstood by
the public. Only after his hearings were finished and he had been
confirmed did I publicly express my concerns. On November 29,
1991, I wrote a letter to Justice Thomas stating what I felt his personal
obligations were, both as a Justice on the Supreme Court and as an
African-American. The following are excerpts from the closing sec-
tions of my letter:
While there are many other equally important issues that you
must consider and on which I have not commented, none will deter-
mine your place in history as much as your defense of the weak, the
poor, minorities, women, the disabled and the powerless .... You,
however, must try to remember that the fundamental problems of
the disadvantaged, women, minorities, and the powerless have not
all been solved simply because you have "moved on up" from Pin
Point, Georgia, to the Supreme Court. In your opening remarks to
the Judiciary Committee, you described your life in Pin Point, Geor-
gia, as "far removed in space and time from this room, this day and
this moment." I have written to tell you that your life today, how-
ever, should be not far removed from the visions and struggles of
Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, Harriet Thbman, Charles
Hamilton Houston, A. Philip Randolph, Mary McLeod Bethune,
W.E.B. DuBois, Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, Martin Luther King,
Judge William Henry Hastie, Justices Thurgood Marshall, Earl War-
ren, and William Brennan, as well as the thousands of others who
9. RESOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BAR IN TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE THURGOOD
MARSHALL, 114 S. Ct. CCCXIX (Nov. 15, 1993) [hereinafter RESOLUTION].
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dedicated much of their lives to create the America that made your
opportunities possible. I hope you have the strength of character to
exemplify those values so that the sacrifices of all these men and
women will not have been in vain.
I am sixty-three [now sixty-five] years old. In my lifetime I
have seen African-Americans denied the right to vote, the opportu-
nities to a proper education, to work, and to live where they choose.
I have seen and known racial segregation and discrimination. But I
have also seen the decision in Brown rendered. I have seen the first
African-American sit on the Supreme Court. And I have seen
brave and courageous people, black and white, give their lives for
the civil rights cause. My memory of them has always been without
bitterness or nostalgia. But today it is sometimes without hope; for
I wonder whether their magnificent achievements are in jeopardy. I
wonder whether (and how far) the majority of the Supreme Court
will continue to retreat from protecting the rights of the poor, wo-
men, the disadvantaged, minorities, and the powerless. And if, trag-
ically, a majority of the Court continues to retreat, I wonder
whether you, Justice Thomas, an African-American, will be part of
that majority.
No one would be happier than I if the record you will establish
on the Supreme Court in years to come demonstrates that my ap-
prehensions were unfounded. You were born into injustice, tem-
pered by the hard reality of what it means to be poor and black in
America, and especially to be poor because you are black. You
have found a door newly cracked open and you have escaped. I
trust you shall not forget that many who preceded you and many
who follow you have found, and will find, the door of equal oppor-
tunity slammed in their faces through no fault of their own. And I
also know that time and the tides of history often call out of men
and women qualities that even they did not know lay within them.
And so, with hope to balance my apprehensions, I wish you well as
a thoughtful and worthy successor to Justice Marshall in the ever
ongoing struggle to assure equal justice under law for all persons.
Sincerely,
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.10
1I. The Public Response To My Letter
More than 17,000 reprints of my letter were sold by the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review."
The letter received such incredible attention that, to my surprise,
I received more than 800 letters from an amazing spectrum of Ameri-
10. Higginbotham, supra note 8, at 1025-28.
11. In addition, there were thousands of photocopies made, greatly multiplying its
impact. As an example, Chief Judge Thelton Henderson told me that he received 28 sepa-
rate photocopies of it from people throughout the country.
August 1994]
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cans. I attempted to classify the responses as: very enthusiastic, en-
thusiastic, noncommittal, critical, and highly critical. Ninety-eight
percent of the letters were enthusiastic or very enthusiastic. But there
were two or three highly critical comments, made by thoughtful per-
sons, that require an analytical response from me. I will comment pri-
marily on these latter critiques, without any feeling of paranoia, in this
lecture.
One Black federal public official, who had been appointed by a
Republican President, included with his letter a number of newspaper
clippings, in which he had been very critical of Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall. After taking several verbal swipes at Justice Marshall, he con-
cluded his comments by asking: "Who gave you the authority to speak
for Black people in this country?"
I was fascinated that he would ask such a question because one
could also inquire of him, when he criticized Justice Marshall, who
gave him the authority to speak for Black people in this country. Ob-
viously, neither of us spoke for anyone other than ourselves. I have
never been under any illusion that I have been anointed with some
mystical power to speak for all African-Americans. 12
However, because the official asked who gave me the authority to
write the letter to Justice Thomas, I have now decided that I should
make a public confession. If he or anyone else really wants a precise
and honest answer as to who gave me the authority to write the letter,
my answer is simple-my wife. After I had drafted the letter, I
showed it to her. She thought it made sense and should be published.
She is now a professor at Harvard, and at that time she was a profes-
sor at the University of Pennsylvania.13 She agreed with the substance
12. When I have received various awards, I did not think there was some poll that had
been taken among Black citizens to ascertain my "worthiness." My more than 70 honorary
degrees do not grant me any "authority to speak for Black people in this country"; they
merely symbolize that the faculties of those institutions thought I should receive an honor-
ary degree.
13. She wrote a book, EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RiGHTEous DiscoNTENT:
THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH 1880-1920 (1993), published
by the Harvard University Press, which has received several book awards from various
organizations. The awards she received include the Distinguished Book Award of the As-
sociation for Research on Non-Profit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA)
(Oct. 1994); Joan Kelly Memorial Prize in Women's History of the American Historical
Association (Jan. 1994); Award for Excellence of the American Academy of Religion
(Nov. 1993); and Letitia Woods Brown Memorial Award of the Association of Black Wo-
men Historians (Oct. 1993). Having earned that kind of academic praise, and several other
awards, I felt that my wife's "approval" was sufficient.
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of the letter and, if approval was necessary, that was where I got my
"authority."
IV. A Professor's Reply and Comments
On June 15, 1992, I received a letter from Professor Evelyn Wil-
son with a draft of an article enclosed. She is an African-American
and teaches at Southern University Law Center, a predominantly
Black law school, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Her article was subse-
quently published under the title, Comments on "An Open Letter to
Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague.'14 She
wrote, in part:
I read Judge Higginbotham's letter quickly the first time and felt
embarrassed for Justice Thomas. He had just assumed a lifetime
position at the top of his career ladder, one of only nine in the na-
tion, a position from which his thoughts, values, perceptions, and
priorities will impact not only this country, but all humanity. Before
Justice Thomas rendered a single judgment, Judge Higginbotham
seemed to suggest that Judge Thomas is immature and not espe-
cially bright. My head said: Give the boy a chance. Let him decide
what to do with his newly gained power. My heart said: Judge Hig-
ginbotham is probably right. I'm glad he expressed our fears.15
I was particularly intrigued by Professor Wilson's comment in ref-
erence to Justice Thomas: "My head said: Give the boy a chance." If
Professor Wilson is serious in labeling Justice Thomas a "boy," we
may have a fundamental disagreement. 16 Justice Thomas is not a
mere boy. Boys play marbles and little league baseball. Men and wo-
14. Evelyn Wilson, Comments on 'An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a
Federal Judicial Colleague,' 20 S.U. L. REv. 141 (1993). The draft that she sent to me is
somewhat different than the draft ultimately published. I have quoted from the final ver-
sion of the article as it was published in the Southern University Law Review.
15. Id. at 142 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
16. I recognize that Professor Wilson may have used the term "boy" as a familial term
of endearment. Sometimes when "we" call each other "boy," we do not mean to suggest
that the person is a juvenile, but rather the expression is a part of the in-house humor that
African-Americans often use when speaking to each other. Professor Wilson's use of the
term in this sense conveys an awareness on her part of the duality of African-American
life, of a measure of commonality of experience. She must recognize that Justice Clarence
Thomas is a part of this "family," for why otherwise would she use the term "boy," and
later acknowledge that my letter to Justice Clarence Thomas expressed "our" fears? Pro-
fessor Wilson's comments in this regard weaken her further assertion that Clarence
Thomas must be allowed "to choose his stance on issues affecting the helpless, the weak,
and the out-numbered." Id. at 147. Justice Clarence Thomas's destiny is as much or more
the result of his experiences as an African-American as those "choices" he makes in devel-
oping his jurisprudence. To suggest that they are separate, as Professor Wilson seems to, is
to ignore the fact that experience does, and properly should, inform a judge. Cf. 1
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1926):
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men sit on the United States Supreme Court. All of the Justices
should be mature, bright, and extremely competent. It is because Jus-
tice Thomas has the power to determine the plight of all Americans,
and particularly the disadvantaged, women, minorities, and the pow-
erless, that I wrote to him. If he were a mere boy, I would have sent
him a bag of marbles or a blank pad with crayons on which he could
draw fantasies. I would not have feared that the destiny of our nation
might in some instances rest on his decisive vote when the Court was
evenly divided.
In her article, Professor Wilson noted that she and Justice
Thomas were "around the same age,"'17 and that, "[a]s we finished
college, graduate school, and professional school, we took advantage
of affirmative action opportunities so dearly won for us. We accepted
them as we believe they were intended .... -18 Her latter comments
underscore a further difference between Professor Wilson's view and
mine. If she got these "affirmative action opportunities," I applaud
her. But under what rationale does Justice Clarence Thomas, after
having had similar opportunities that made his success possible,19 have
the moral basis to become hostile to such options being made avail-
able to the present generation of African-Americans, many of whom
have found barriers to entry as high and impenetrable as any he
encountered?
The Court is not an organism dissociated from the conditions and history of the
times in which it exists. It does not formulate and deliver its opinions in a legal
vacuum. Its Judges are not abstract and impersonal oracles, but are men whose
views are necessarily, though by no conscious intent, affected by inheritance, edu-
cation and environment and by the impact of history past and present.
Id. at 2.
17. Wilson, supra note 14, at 142.
18. Id. at 143.
19. During his more honest and less conservative days in 1983, Justice Thomas said:
But for affirmative action laws, God only knows where I would be today. These
laws and their proper application are all that stand between the first 17 years of
my life and the second 17 years.
Excerpts from some of Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas's speeches, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Sept. 9, 1991, at 2.
As he tried to ingratiate himself with the Reagan Administration, he reversed his posi-
tion 180 degrees. In 1987 he wrote:
I firmly insist that the Constitution be interpreted in a colorblind fashion. Hence
I emphasize black self-help, as opposed to racial quotas and other race-conscious
legal devices that only further and deepen the original problem.
Id.
In 1988 he stated:
Affirmative action programs have given no substantial benefits to blacks. The
term has thus become a mere political buzz word.
[Vol. 45
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In another portion of her article, Professor Wilson writes:
What Judge Higginbotham has said to Justice Thomas could and
should have been said to all nine of the Justices. Judge Higginbot-
ham could tell all nine that they did not get where they are by them-
selves. And all nine would acknowledge an indebtedness to some,
but not all, of those who have helped them. Judge Higginbotham
could tell all nine Justices that nothing "will determine your place in
history as much as your defense of the weak, the poor, minorities,
women, the disabled, and the powerless." But he does not.
Judge Higginbotham demands something from this Black Justice
that he does not demand from a White Justice. He would allow a
White Justice to choose to be liberal or conservative, average or
great, pro business or pro people, but deny to Justice Thomas the
right to choose his stance on issues affecting the helpless, the weak,
and the out-numbered. In like fashion, others would deny Judge
Higginbotham the right to choose where to live, where to eat, or
where to sit on a bus.
We cannot measure Justice Thomas by Justice Marshall. Justice
Marshall chose to use his talent and training to fight in the civil
rights struggle. He dedicated his life to creating options for Black
Americans. Justice Marshall fought for the right of Justice Thomas
to determine his own destiny. Perhaps Justice Thomas is a proper
heir to Justice Marshall's seat.20
My response to Professor Wilson's comments as to the demands I
make on Justice Thomas is that I believe all Justices of the Supreme
Court should be fair to everyone, and particularly in the "defense of
the weak, the poor, minorities, women, the disabled, and the power-
less." However, I do believe that it is a tragic irony when a Black
Justice adopts the anti-minority position advocated by the most con-
servative and racially uninformed Justice on the Court, and when even
many of his White colleagues demonstrate a far greater insight and
concern about the history of the plight of African-Americans in this
country.
V. The Duality Standard
I am appreciative of the substantial time that Professor Wilson
spent analyzing my letter to Justice Thomas. I respect disagreements,
and I think that her comments are quite thoughtful; however, I submit
respectfully that her writing suggests some confusion about the una-
voidable obligation and status in life one has as an African-Ameri-
can-an obligation and status attributable to historic policies that
have at various times been invoked by the overall American society.
20. Wilson, supra note 14, at 146-47 (footnotes omitted).
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Though written in good faith and with obvious intelligence, she fails to
appreciate fully the duality status that one has as an African-Ameri-
can in this society. W.E.B. DuBois in his classic book, The Souls of
Black Folk, written in 1903, describes this "double consciousness, this
sense of always looking at oneself through the eyes of others. '' 21 He
explains:
One ever feels his twoness-an American, a Negro; two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark
body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn
asunder.
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife-this
longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self
into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the
older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for
America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not
bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he
knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply
wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an
American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, with-
out having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face.22
Now I don't know whether, at times, in his own mind, Justice
Thomas recognizes that he was born both Black and American. How-
ever, I presume that if he looks in his mirror, with or without his wife's
presence, he must recognize that he looks Black. And as much as he
might enjoy his present pinnacle of success as a Supreme Court Jus-
tice, the truth of the matter is that he has not been able, and will never
be able as long as he lives in this nation, to avoid his dual status as
both an American and simultaneously an African-American.2 3 The
21. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (1903).
22. Id.
23. If the resigning Supreme Court Justice had not been African-American, there is
no doubt Clarence Thomas would not even have been considered for the appointment.
His credentials were as slender as one could find for a Supreme Court nominee, as others
have noted:
Before he became a federal judge, he had never argued a single case in federal
court. Indeed, before he joined the D.C. Circuit, his entire career as a litigator
consisted of serving his first two and a half years out of law school as an entry-
level lawyer on the staff of the Missouri Attorney General.
Jeffery Toobin, The Burden of Clarence Thomas, THE NEw YORKER, Sept. 27, 1993, at 38,
46.
Charles Bowser, a distinguished African-American lawyer, opined:
I'd be willing to bet.., that not one of the senators who voted to confirm Clar-
ence Thomas would hire him as their lawyer.
Peter Binzer, Bowser Is an Old Hand at Playing the Political Game in Philadelphia, PHILA.
INOUTRER, Nov. 13, 1991, at All (quoting Charles Bowser).
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first sign of emotional maturity in all African-American public offi-
cials is the recognition of this duality that we all confront daily.24
One of my closest friends is Damon Keith, a great federal judge,
who is also an African-American. He was the Chief Judge of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and
for the last fifteen years he has been a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. During the recent Bicenten-
nial period celebrating the founding of our Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, he was chairperson of the prestigious committee appointed
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and endorsed by the United States Judicial
Conference. Their task was to recognize the significance of the Bill of
Rights on its two hundredth anniversary. Accordingly, there was a
program in Williamsburg, Virginia, for federal judges throughout the
country. It was planned brilliantly, with several provocative and in-
sightful substantive addresses, focusing on the challenges that James
Madison had confronted as the major draftsperson of the Bill of
Rights and, even more important, focusing on the evolution of the Bill
of Rights, an evolution that makes our nation a far more ideal democ-
racy than it would be otherwise.
During a session break of the conference, this premier federal
judge, Damon Keith, stood outside on the sidewalk of the hotel in
Williamsburg, talking with five other federal judges. As always, he
was dressed elegantly. He had on a three-piece blue suit with a deli-
cate chalk stripe. Except for the judges in California, if you will ex-
cuse the reference, most federal judges dress alike. So here we have
I sometimes believe that Justice Thomas has forgotten these facts about himself and
his lack of experience.
Others have suggested that Clarence Thomas's inexperience will lead him in the future
to rethink his ideas on important issues. The distinguished Guido Calabresi, now a judge
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, former Dean of Yale Law
School, made during the confirmation hearings what he thought was the most favorable
comment about Clarence Thomas, that he supported Judge Thomas because of his "capac-
ity for growth." But he also stated:
I would expect that at least some of his views may change again. I would be less
than candid, if I did not tell you that I sincerely hope so, for I disagree with many,
perhaps most of the public positions which Judge Thomas has taken in the past
few years.
Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Nomination of Judge
Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., S. Hrg. 102-1084, pt. 2, at 249-50.
24. For minority women, there is often a third factor-gender-in addition to those of
race and being an American. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 13, at 8; Evelyn Brooks
Higginbotham, African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race, re-
printed in 17 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SocIETY 251-74 (1992).
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six people in blue or gray suits, discussing some of the subtle points
various scholars had made at the morning session. Suddenly a woman
pulled into the driveway, jumped out of her car, walked over to this
group of six federal judges, handed her keys to Damon, and said,
"Here are my keys. Please park the car carefully." Now, Damon is an
individual of exquisite politeness. Many Black people would not have
responded with his restraint. He said, "Madame, I am not at the hotel
as a service employee. I am here as chairman of the United States
Judicial Conference on the Celebration of the Bicentennial of the Bill
of Rights, and I cannot help you." She pulled the keys back and then
rushed over to a White person who had the traditional garb of a door-
man, handed him the keys, and dashed off.
Let me give you one other example as to why I think that healthy
African-Americans in public life have to understand the duality of our
lives. In January 1964, on my first day of active duty in the federal
courts in Philadelphia (as Thelton has noted, I was then 35 years old),
I drove to work in my new station wagon. I did some reminiscing and
I thought first of my mother, who had worked for decades in other
people's kitchens, who for decades had scrubbed other people's floors,
who had accepted denigration, and who had been denied an adequate
education in rural Virginia. With dignity she tolerated all adversities
because, as she said, "Someday, son, I want to see you in a white shirt
and a tie, and have an important position." I also thought of my fa-
ther, who had worked at a factory for decades, never having been pro-
moted. Immigrant laborers would come in unable to speak English.
He would teach them how to speak English, how to read the instruc-
tions and to make the mathematical calculations for job reports. And
then, some years later, some would become his foremen, and he
would continue at the lowest job and salary level where he would train
another generation of immigrants. As I was reflecting on those events
that morning, I said a silent prayer thanking God for my parents, and
thanking Him for this extraordinary opportunity, and requesting of
Him: Please make me strong so that I will be the type of federal judge
who was worthy of the appointment.
I parked in the spot clearly reserved for federal judges, got out of
the car, took out my two attach6 cases, and proceeded to walk to the
street. After I had gone only a few feet, someone yelled to me, "Hey,
boy, you can't park your car there." I continued to walk, and he said,
"Hey, boy, didn't you hear me? You can't park your car there." Now
at that point a sense of reality came. I knew that I had two attach6
cases in my hand, and he had a gun in his holster. So I turned around
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS IN RETROSPECT
and calmly said, "What is the problem, officer?" He said, "That spot
is reserved for federal judges only." And I responded, "I know. That
is why I parked there." And then, with his face flushed, he said, "Oh!
You're Judge Higginbotham. Welcome." And I walked into the
courthouse considering it just another typical incident Black people
experience as part of their daily duality challenge. I knew that if I had
been White, dressed as I was, he would not have called me "boy."
The difference between being called "boy" or "sir" was solely the
color of my skin, yet for the next few years, whenever the same guard
was on duty, he was always excessively deferential. He was supportive
to an almost embarrassing extent. When you pulled out of the drive-
way of the then-U.S. Courthouse, you entered two major traffic lanes
going both east and west, and it was somewhat difficult to get in the
westbound lane. When I would get in my car, before I had turned on
the switch, he would go out and hold up traffic, east and west, and say,
"Judge Higginbotham's coming through."
Now, I am not saying that the guard was a racist, and I am not
saying that the woman who gave Damon her keys was a racist, but
they had certain stereotypical perceptions of Blacks and both of these
events reflect the significance of the duality that the African-Ameri-
can experiences. Suffering such indignities is very much a part of the
African-American experience, central to our duality. Unless an Afri-
can-American recognizes that duality which envelops his or her life,
he or she will have trouble understanding the struggle of other minori-
ties or the problems of the weak, the poor, and the dispossessed. In
the broader context of life, these two incidents involving Damon and
me were relatively minor. Damon Keith and I were not denied a job;
we were not denied food; we had not been forced on unemployment
lines; we had not been denied adequate education, as millions of mi-
norities and poor persons have been. While most African-Americans
my age could cite hundreds of far more provocative incidents, I cite
these events as the types of typical, daily experiences Black people
have had in this country. As an example, Professor William E.
Leuchtenburg recently commented on one of the nation's most distin-
guished historians, John Hope Franklin, as follows:
He has achieved all of this despite having had to cope with the out-
rageous indignities that can be visited on a black person in our soci-
ety. When his father, who was an attorney in Indian Territory
before it became Oklahoma, moved to Tulsa, the building in which
he had acquired a law office was burned down by a white mob, and
for months his father had to work out of a tent. As a boy riding on
a Jim Crow train in Oklahoma, John Hope and his mother were put
off the coach by a white conductor and left stranded in the dust.
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When as a graduate student he sought to pursue historical research
at the archives in Raleigh, he was not permitted to sit with white
researchers but was shunted off to an isolated chamber. The Li-
brary of Congress was still worse. I recall that when in 1946 I was
the only white on the field staff of a civil rights lobby in Washington,
I could not eat with my colleagues at any downtown restaurant, not
even at the greasiest People's Drug Store counter. Nor, after having
fought a victorious war against fascism, was there a downtown
movie a black person could go to, or a downtown hotel at which, in
the nation's capital, a black person could stay. That was John
Hope's experience as a young scholar.
During this same period, on a train journey in North Carolina from
Greensboro to Durham, he was compelled to stand even though
there were ample seats in an adjacent coach-for those coach seats
were reserved for whites, who sat there grinning at his discomfort.
They were Nazi prisoners of war.
It would be nice to say, "Thank God, that's all behind us now." But
even today this great man-who has recently celebrated his sev-
enty-eighth birthday, who has achieved so much, who has been ac-
corded so many honors, who, anyone can see at one glance, is a
courtly gentleman of enormous dignity and imposing presence-
cannot, in the cosmopolitan city of New York, hail a cab without
apprehension that it may not stop for him-solely because he is
black.25
In view of the persistent racial duality in this country, I was pro-
foundly concerned about how the mind of Justice Clarence Thomas
functioned. Did he recognize that he could not evade the conse-
quence of being an African-American? Regardless of where one
lives, regardless of the race of one's spouse,26 and regardless of the
adulation one may get from the conservative press, one cannot avoid
the reality of being Black in America. In making this analysis, I am
not suggesting some racial political litmus test that Justice Thomas and
all African-Americans must meet. Nevertheless, I would hope that no
African-American in high public office would become a major voice
in the intentional destruction of the potential of his own people. No
judge, whatever his race, should do that. And if the person who en-
gages in destructive conduct against a minority is also a member of a
minority group that has been historically discriminated against, what
is its special significance?
25. William E. Leuchtenburg, Tribute: John Hope Franklin, 42 DUKE L.J. 1022, 1023-
24 (1993).
26. For the significance of Justice Clarence Thomas's spouse, see Higginbotham, supra
note 8, at 1022-25. Cf A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEo. L.J. 1967 (1989).
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The Holocaust was a brutal, devastating, inhumane, unjustifiable
tragedy. Everyone, be they Jew or Gentile, Protestant or Catholic,
Muslim or atheist, White or Black, should condemn the Holocaust.
However, I think that it would be even more disturbing if persons who
were the heirs of the individuals who died or were brutalized in Au-
schwitz and other concentration camps spoke tolerantly of religious
cruelty, religious oppression, and genocide. I also feel the same way
about those African-Americans who disavow their roots on funda-
mental matters and become participants in unjustified efforts to limit
rational Black aspirations.
To further illustrate my concerns, I suggest two hypothetical
American analogies. In the Dred Scott27 case, the United States
Supreme Court decided an important issue: whether a Black person
could be a citizen of the United States. Chief Justice Roger Brooke
Taney, writing for the Court, declared that, by the United States Con-
stitution, a Black man had "no rights which the white man was bound
to respect."28 That racist view became federal constitutional law.
However, two Justices-Benjamin R. Curtis of Massachusetts and
John McLean of Ohio-dissented. They asserted that the majority
opinion was erroneous constitutional doctrine. The high court of his-
tory tells us that the dissenters were correct.2 9 But think of what an
even greater tragedy it would have been if, in 1857, a Black had been
on the Supreme Court and had joined in the majority opinion.
Perhaps an even more apt hypothetical would be based on the
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson3o decision, the other of the two most devastat-
ing racial "civil rights" cases ever written. Seven Justices of the
Supreme Court declared that a Louisiana statute that segregated pas-
sengers solely on the basis of race did not violate the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendments.3 1 Counsel for Homer Plessy had argued
that if the state could intrude in such a pervasive fashion on matters
pertaining to race, then the state could require segregation of other
groups without any violation of their constitutional rights. He sug-
gested that, under such a rationale, states would even be able to re-
quire the segregation of blondes from redheads, or Irish from Italians,
27. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
28. Id. at 407.
29. See also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScorT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 580 (1978) (exploring the history of the Dred Scott decision
and how it became the "most frequently overturned decision in history").
30. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
31. Id. at 542, 550-51.
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or Jews from Catholics.32 To avoid the "traditions of the people" 33
that sanctioned racial discrimination during the Plessy era, some
Blacks with mixed heritage sought to highlight the "white" aspect of
their lineage. Indeed, counsel for the plaintiff had argued that Plessy,
who was seven-eighths White, was deprived of his reputation of being
White by the conductor's power to order him to sit in the colored
section. Counsel also contended that being considered a White man
was property "which [had] an actual pecuniary value" that could not
be taken without due process of law.34 To prove his point, he asked
the Court:
How much would it be worth to a young man entering upon the
practice of law to be regarded as a white man rather than a colored
one? Six-sevenths of the population are white. Nineteen-twenti-
eths of the property of the country is owned by white people.
Ninety-nine hundredths of the business opportunities are in the con-
trol of white people. These propositions are rendered even more
startling by the intensity of feeling which excludes the colored man
from the friendship and companionship of the white man. Probably
most white persons if given a choice, would prefer death to life in
the United States as colored persons. Under these conditions, is it
possible to conclude that the reputation of being white is not prop-
erty? Indeed, is it not the most valuable sort of property, being the
master-key that unlocks the golden door of opportunity? 35
Because of the broad range attack by Plessy's counsel, the Court
was faced with several issues. First, it had to decide whether there was
a property right in being "white, ' 36 and, if there were such a property
right, could that right have been breached by the conductor treating a
"white" man as if he were colored, and whether, under state law, the
"victim" might be entitled to a damage award. In effect, the Court
32. The Supreme Court categorized his argument as follows:
In this connection, it is also suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in
error that the same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring
railways to provide separate accommodations for the two races will also authorize
them to require separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain
color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws
requiring colored people to walk upon one side of the street, and white people
upon the other, or requiring white men's houses to be painted white, and colored
men's black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different colors, upon the
theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or that a house or vehicle
of one color is as good as one of another color.
Id. at 549-50.
33. Id. at 550.
34. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 9, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210).
35. Id.
36. For a more detailed discussion of the legal processes used to define whether one
was or was not white, see Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 26, at 1969-2000.
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decided that, if someone who was "white" had been treated as if she
or he were colored, then the "white" person would have sustained a
breach of a property right, for which, under certain state laws, she or
he might be entitled to compensatory financial damages for such hu-
miliation.37 Additionally, the Court was confronted with the difficulty
of articulating a rationale that would justify a state's intrusion on the
basis of race but, at the same time, not implicitly sanction such state-
imposed segregation of various White religious groups or any other
Whites on the basis of their national origin, or even the segregation of
"people whose hair is of a certain color" (e.g., segregating redheads
from blondes). Justice Brown sought to put implicit limitations on the
power of the state. Speaking for the majority, he said:
The reply to all this is that every exercise of the police power must
be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good
faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoy-
ance or oppression of a particular class .... So far, then, as a con-
flict with the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment is concerned, the case
reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a
reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessar-
ily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determin-
ing the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with
reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this
standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even re-
quires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is un-
reasonable .... 38
In effect, the majority's decision meant that it was "reasonable"
for the State of Louisiana to segregate Blacks and, therefore, do to
Black people what would be unreasonable if done to any sub-group of
Whites-such as requiring segregation of all Jews, or of all Catholics,
or of all Irish, or of all redheads, or of all blondes. It is inconceivable
that the majority would ever have sanctioned as "reasonable" the seg-
regation of any of the latter groups. The Supreme Court in Plessy
37. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549. The majority added:
It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to consti-
tute a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which
there is a difference of opinion in the different States; some holding that any
visible admixture of black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored
race (citations omitted). But these are questions to be determined under the laws
of each state, and are not properly put in issue in this case. Under the allegations
of his petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether,
under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race.
Id. at 552.
38. Id. at 550-51 (emphasis added).
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placed its imprimatur on state-imposed racial segregation and left to
the "large discretion . . . of the legislature" 39 the determination
whether the state would separate and treat Black people differently
than it did any other group-majority or minority-in American soci-
ety. In the context of the times, the Court's reference to the "estab-
lished usages, customs and traditions of the people" 40 was nothing less
than a mandate for states to revert to the past biases, prejudices, and
discrimination that had provided the rationale for slavery and
America's earlier legitimization of racism-the very racism that was
the target of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
The majority's thinly veiled reversion to a slavery-type jurisprudence,
despite its invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment, was revealed by
its frequent citations to and reliance upon many cases that predated
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
Fortunately, one great Justice, John Marshall Harlan, wrote a
mighty dissent.42 But imagine if, in 1896, a Black had been on the
Supreme Court, how much more devastating it would have been if the
Black Justice had joined with the majority, rather than joining in
Harlan's dissent. These hypothetical analogies based on the Dred
Scott and Plessy cases are my answer to Professor Wilson's complaint
that I "would allow a White Justice to choose to be liberal or con-
servative, average or great, pro business or pro people, but deny to
Justice Thomas the right to choose his stance on issues affecting the
helpless, the weak, and the out-numbered. '43
39. Id. at 550.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 544 (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849)); id.
at 548 (citing West Chester & Philadelphia R.R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867). In West
Chester, a pre-Fourteenth Amendment case involving segregation on a public carrier, the
court stated:
Why the Creator made one [race] black and the other white, we know not; but the
fact is apparent, and the races distinct, each producing its own kind, and following
the peculiar law of its constitution. Conceding equality, with natures as perfect
and rights as sacred, yet God has made them dissimilar, with those natural in-
stincts and feelings which He always imparts to His creatures when He intends
that they shall not overstep the natural boundaries He has assigned to them. The
natural law which forbids their intermarriage and that social amalgamation which
leads to a corruption of races, is as clearly divine as that which imparted to them
different natures. The tendency of intimate social intermixture is to amalgama-
tion, contrary to the law of races.
West Chester, 55 Pa. at 213.
42. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Wilson, supra note 14, at 147.
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The relevance of the majority opinions in Dred Scott and Plessy
to Justice Clarence Thomas is that, at times, in his opinions, he is as
conservative for this generation of the Supreme Court as were the
majority of Justices who acted so hostilely to Blacks in Dred Scott and
Plessy. I think such extreme conservatism is a compounded irony
when advocated by an African-American. At another time, I will dis-
cuss the many cases in which Justice Clarence Thomas supported
either a racist or a wretchedly conservative position, but here I will
discuss only two cases, and primarily Hudson v. McMillian.44 They
implicitly raise the questions: What goes on in Justice Thomas's mind;
has Justice Thomas "forgotten where he came from; 45 is there some
similarity between his conservative views in the 1990s and those of the
majorities in Plessy and Dred Scott in the 19th century?46
The devastating consequences of Justice Thomas's conservative
decisions on the Court reach beyond the legal effects. In Presley v.
Etowah County Commission,47 the Court considered the legality of a
County Commission's action stripping power from the first Black
County Commissioner elected in that county since the Reconstruction
era. Until the County Commission's action, the undeviated tradition
had been that the Commissioner residing in a district exercised con-
trol over a road shop, equipment, and road crew for that district. That
Commissioner exercised control over spending decisions within the
district. When Presley, the first Black Commissioner in recent history,
was elected, the Commission transferred the decision-making power
from the local commissioner and placed it with the majority of the
44. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
45. Sadler, supra note 5.
46. Jeffery Toobin, in THE NEw YORKER, describes Justice Clarence Thomas's conser-
vatism as follows:
Thomas is unique partly because his jurisprudential philosophy, as reflected in his
votes and opinions, appears to be more than simply conservative: he looks well
on his way to being ranked as one of the most conservative Justices of the late-
twentieth century. This was foreshadowed by his service in the Reagan and Bush
Administrations, when Thomas portrayed himself in his speeches as a zealot of
the hard right. Confronted with those speeches during his confirmation hearings,
however, Thomas dismissed them as the musings of a 'part-time political theorist.'
As a Justice, he promised the senators, he would 'strip down, like a runner, to
eliminate ideologies.' Instead, in his first two years he has worn his ideological
convictions like a full-length parka. Perhaps more that any other person who
might have been named to the Court, Thomas repudiates everything that his
predecessor, Thurgood Marshall, stood for. Thomas's every vote-even his every
public utterance, written or spoken-seems designed to outrage the liberal estab-
lishment that so venerated Marshall.
Toobin, supra note 23, at 41-42.
47. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
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County Commission. The resolution deprived Presley of any singular
control. The Court upheld the Commission's action, holding that such
a change did not implicate the preclearance requirements of Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.48 As related by Alice Presley, wife
of the late Lawrence Presley, the plaintiff in the case, the fact that
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion against Blacks left the
most pain and frustration:
Early on, he said maybe we ought to give the guy [Thomas] a
chance .... But after the Supreme Court hearing on his case, he
said it was a mistake. That really hurt him more than the decision
itself, because this black man voted no. He would walk around say-
ing, "I can't believe Thomas voted against me." 49
In this sense, Justice Thomas's views are just as extreme and
harmful as the conservative views in Plessy and Dred Scott. His iden-
tity as an African-American deepens the wounds. In the words of
Professor Grover Hankins: "There was no reason for him to support
a conservative point of view in those cases; it would not have cost him
anything to vote right."'50
Justice Thomas willfully crippled African-American interests, just
as Chief Justice Taney declared unnecessarily that Black persons had
"no rights which the white man was bound to respect."51
VI. Justice Thomas's Dissent in Hudson v. McMillian 52
Hudson v. McMillian involved a case in which a Black prisoner
was taken out of his cell, put into a holding room with his feet shack-
led and hands cuffed in back of him, and beaten by two guards.5 3 His
teeth were loosened, his dental plate broken, his lips burst, eye
blacked, and he was kicked in his back.5 4 The issue before the United
States Supreme Court was whether that beating violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.55
Seven Justices declared, and I think it took no great courage to say so,
that in a civilized society you cannot allow law enforcement officials,
without any provocation or justification, to beat and brutalize citizens,
48. Id.
49. Trevor W. Coleman, Doubting Thomas, EMERGE, Nov. 1993, at 39, 40 (quoting
Alice Presley).
50. Id. at 42 (quoting Grover Hankins).
51. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
52. 112 S. Ct. 995, 1004-11 (1992).
53. Id. at 997.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 998.
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even if those citizens are prisoners. In Hudson, only one person, Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas, wrote a dissent criticizing the very rational and
civilized opinion of the majority; he was joined in his opinion only by
Justice Scalia.56 After the opinion came down on February 27, 1992,
the New York Times wrote an editorial that called Justice Thomas "the
youngest, cruelest justice. '57 Other commentators were not quite as
polite.
To put this case in perspective, I will quote extensively from Wil-
liam Raspberry's column in The Washington Post.58 He had supported
Justice Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court, but on Febru-
ary 28, 1992, Raspberry wrote the following:
Clarence:
I know I'm supposed to call you Justice Thomas, but I don't want to
be quite that formal. I want to talk straight to a guy I thought I
knew a little.
You know what I want to talk about. It's that dissent of yours in the
matter of Hudson v. McMillian. Come on, Clarence. Conservative
is one thing; bizarre is another.
After discussing the prisoner's injuries, Raspberry noted:
What was truly bizarre is that when the conservative-dominated
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision this week,
yours was one of only two dissenting voices.
To tell you the truth, Clarence, I'm personally embarrassed. You
know you weren't my choice to succeed Thurgood Marshall on the
nation's highest court. You were too conservative for my taste and,
more significant, I thought you lacked the requisite judicial experi-
ence. But I thought I understood your conservatism as a sort of
harsh pragmatism that most of us harbor to some degree. I cau-
tioned black America not to let your conservatism blind them to
your intellectual honesty. Conservatism, I insisted, isn't the same
thing as stupidity-even in a black man. And since Bush was going
to name a conservative to Thurgood's seat, I said, better he should
appoint a conservative who has known deprivation and unfairness
and racism at first hand.
As a matter of fact, you encouraged that view. I mean, wasn't that
the whole point of your recital of your underprivileged background,
of your but-for-the-grace-of-God musings about society's losers?
Look, guy, I never expected you to do a Hugo Black and become a
court liberal. But I was prepared to see you put a compassionate
face on conservatism. When it became clear that you would be con-
firmed to the court, I told my friends (your critics) that they should
56. Id. at 1004.
57. The Youngest, Cruelest Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A24 (editorial).




just watch while you surprised your right-wing supporters and con-
founded our enemies.
But your high-falutin' angels-on-a-pinhead opinion the other day
that for prison guards to beat the hell out of a handcuffed and
shackled inmate does not constitute "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" (unless the victim winds up in intensive care) confounded
only those who tried to cut you some slack.59
Raspberry concluded: "Of course, I don't expect that you will
always do what strikes the rest of us as 'the right thing.' But why go
out of your way to do wrong?" 60
His dissent in the Hudson case, and his votes in a series of other
cases, demonstrate that Justice Thomas has often taken wretchedly re-
actionary positions. I believe that his views are for the 1990s at times
the moral equivalent of the views of the shameful majorities in the
nineteenth century Supreme Court cases of Dred Scott and Plessy.
Ninety-eight years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided
Plessy, legitimizing racism and retarding racial progress for almost a
century. Last year, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter said,
"[W]e think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided." 61 Other jus-
tices, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, have agreed. 62 In short, I
submit that, like the majority in Plessy, Justice Thomas's dissent in
Hudson "was wrong the day" it was written.
I have often pondered how it is that Justice Thomas, an African-
American, could be so insensitive to the plight of the powerless. Why
is he no different or probably even worse than many of the most con-
servative Supreme Court Justices of this century? I can think of only
one Supreme Court Justice during this century who was worse than
Justice Clarence Thomas-James McReynolds, a white supremacist 63
who referred to Blacks as "niggers. ' '64 In 1938 a landmark desegrega-
tion case was argued before the Supreme Court by Charles Hamilton
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2813 (1992).
62. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's view that
"Plessy v. Ferguson was wrong" when decided. 448 U.S. 448, 522-23 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
63. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & William C. Smith, The Hughes Court and the
Beginning of the End of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1109-
11 (1992). See also Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration:
The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1622, 1641 (1986); David Burner, James
C. McReynolds, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at
2023, 2023 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969) (noting Justice McReynolds's "ra-
cist streak").
64. See infra text accompanying note 68.
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Houston, 65 the brilliant Black lawyer who laid the foundation for
Brown v. Board of Education.66 During Houston's oral argument,
McReynolds turned his back on the attorney and stared at the wall of
the courtroom.67 In his autobiography, Justice William 0. Douglas
described how McReynolds received a rare, but well deserved, come-
uppance when he made a disparaging comment about Howard
University:
One day McReynolds went to the barbershop in the Court. Gates,
the black barber, put the sheet around his neck and over his lap, and
as he was pinning it behind him McReynolds said, "Gates, tell me,
where is this nigger university in Washington, D.C.?" Gates re-
moved the white cloth from McReynolds, walked around and faced
him, and said in a very calm and dignified manner, "Mr. Justice, I
am shocked that any Justice would call a Negro a nigger. There is a
Negro college in Washington, D.C. Its name is Howard University
and we are very proud of it." McReynolds muttered some kind of
apology and Gates resumed his work in silence.68
VII. The Mind of Justice Clarence Thomas-Is It Entangled
With "Racial Self-Hatred"?
One day during the summer of 1993, I was in my study with a
number of constitutional law books and Supreme Court advance
sheets scattered about. It was soon after the end of the Supreme
Court Term, and I was marking up various opinions Justice Thomas
had authored. As my daughter entered the study, I said, "Justice
Thomas is incredible-absolutely unbelievable." During the ensuing
days, I had extensive conversations with my daughter, who has her
doctorate in clinical psychology, and with her friends,69 who are
trained in clinical psychology and social work. Their conclusions and
basic comments could be summarized as follows:
Though, at times you can get some insights on Clarence Thomas
merely by looking at his behavior as expressed through his judicial
opinions, the stilted language used in judicial opinions often does
not reveal some of the underlying motivations in the author's mind.
Of course, the very fact that he so consistently votes against the best
interest of African-Americans reveals a great deal about his sense
of racial identity and his lack of racial self-esteem. Those votes sug-
65. Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 338 (1938).
66. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
67. Videotaped Statement of Judge Robert Carter to Judge Higginbotham (Aug.
1987) (reviewing his observation of the argument in Gaines, 305 U.S. at 337).
68. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: 1939-1975, at 14-15 (1980).
69. Karen L. Higginbotham, Psy. D., Clinical Psychologist; Jacqui Cunningham,
L.C.S.W. Clinical Social Worker, Charlene M. Smith, Psy. D., Clinical Psychologist.
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gest that there are many aspects of racial self-hatred that sometimes
trigger the perverse conclusions he reaches.
They recalled that in my Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas,
I had chided Justice Thomas for his condemnation in 1987 of Justice
Thurgood Marshall. During the year of the Bicentennial celebration
of the Constitution, Justice Marshall had cautioned all Americans not
to overlook the momentous events that followed the drafting of that
document and to "seek ... a sensitive understanding of the Constitu-
tion's inherent defects, and its promising evolution through 200 years
of history."70 Justice Marshall had argued that it was the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments that made
America greater than it otherwise would have been.71 Justice Thomas
had claimed that Marshall's observations on the deficiencies of the
framers' constitutional vision "alienates all Americans, and not just
Black Americans, from their high and noble intention. 7 2 Justice
Thomas wrote op-ed pieces condemning Justice Marshall for his criti-
cal comments on the Bicentennial celebration. 73 He asserted that by
his critique of the forefathers, Justice Marshall had disgraced Black
people.
My daughter and her friends suggested that Clarence Thomas's
response to Marshall's critique of the "founding fathers" was a classic
profile of a victim's identification with the aggressor. They suggested
that Clarence Thomas condemned Thurgood Marshall for criticizing
the founders because, in Thomas's mind, he has been so close to Rea-
gan and Bush, that he is, as he admitted in his article, "alienated"
from Marshall's commentary. In short, he doesn't see himself as one
of the potential victims. In his confused mind, he sees himself as one
who would be a confidant of Jefferson, assisting Jefferson with the
Declaration of Independence. He sees himself as one who would be a
friend of James Madison, assisting James Madison with the writing of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and that is the only reason
why, in 1987, Clarence Thomas would have said that Justice Marshall's
criticism of the forefathers "alienates all Americans, and not just
Black Americans, from their high and noble intention."
They suggested that you can read all of his opinions, but you will
never have the insights offered by his developmental history, which
70. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
71. Id. at 2-4.
72. Clarence Thomas, Black Americans Based Claim for Freedom on Constitution,
SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Oct. 6, 1987, at B7.
73. See id.
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would explain the inner workings of a mind that is entangled with
racial self-hatred. His overwhelming racial self-hatred will never be
revealed in the traditional, muted language and abstractions that
judges customarily use in judicial opinions. They concluded that it
was their hunch that the ambiguous and institutional language of the
law often masks the motivations that triggered the conclusions
reached.
I had hoped that my daughter was wrong as to Justice Thomas's
mind. But after having read several other opinions that Justice
Thomas either wrote or joined in, I would now say to my.daughter
that she and her colleagues have persuaded me that there must be
some mystical force or, as they phrase it, "internal drive" that compels
Justice Thomas to some of his persistently absurd and hostile anti-
minority decisions, and it may very well be attributable to factors of a
racial self-hatred that not even he fully comprehends. My daughter
and her friends' analysis of Clarence Thomas's racial self-hatred is not
far from other thinkers' conclusions on the subject. William E. Nel-
son, a political science and Black Studies professor at Ohio State Uni-
versity, observed:
From the time he was chair of the EEOC, I always considered Clar-
ence Thomas to be the worst kind of racist-a black man who hates
himself.... He seemed to have no sense of history of commitment
to black liberation and progress. Politically, he established net-
works with some of the biggest white racists in the country, and
helped to develop a political machine that stifled some of the social,
economic, and political progress of blacks as a whole.74
Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theo-
ries, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed. 75
Could it be that many of Justice Thomas's adjudications on race
relations result from his own "prejudices" and hostilities to African-
Americans? Could it be that this prejudice stemming from racial self-
hatred has, to paraphrase Justice -Holmes's statement, "a good deal
more to do than the syllogism"'76 published in the opinion that an-
nounces "the rules by which [persons] should be governed"? 77
74. Coleman, supra note 49, at 39, 41.





VIII. Personal Reflections on Justice Marshall's Last Year
and His Death
Justice Thomas's performance on the Court stands in stark con-
trast to that of his predecessor-Justice Thurgood Marshall. The im-
pact upon me of the transition is probably best put in context with
some of my personal reflections and emotions about Justice Marshall
during the last year of his life and about the public response to his
funeral. Six months before his death, I spoke at a ceremony outside of
Independence Hall in Philadelphia where Justice Marshall received
the coveted Liberty Bell Award. In his earlier years, I had known
Thurgood Marshall as a strong, physically imposing man whom I saw
argue seminal cases before the Supreme Court. My tribute to him in
the Harvard Law Review78 conveyed the profound impression he had
on me throughout my career. In many ways, the July 4, 1992 presenta-
tion was a most poignant setting. Thurgood Marshall was too frail to
even walk up the steps to the podium. Instead, they put him in his
wheelchair on a platform on a forklift truck, and the forklift driver,
with Thurgood's son Goody holding onto the wheelchair, brought him
up to the podium. They moved him forward ever so gently, and then
we rolled the wheelchair to the microphone so that he could speak to
receive the award. It was one of his last two speeches to the public.
He said:
I wish I could say that racism and prejudice were only distant mem-
ories.., and that liberty and equality were just around the bend. I
wish I could say that America has come to appreciate diversity and
to see and accept similarity. But as I look around, I see not a nation
of unity but of division-Afro and white, indigenous and immigrant,
rich and poor, educated and illiterate. Even many educated whites
and successful Negroes have given up on integration and lost hope
in equality. They see nothing in common-except the need to flee
as fast as they can from our inner cities. But there is a price to be
paid for division and isolation, as recent events in California
indicate. 79
Although Justice Marshall looked frail in the beginning of the
speech, it was amazing to observe that, at the end, his voice was as
booming as I had heard it at those magnificent times when he argued
before the Supreme Court. He said:
78. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 55 (1991).
79. See CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUS-
TIcE THURGOOD MARSHALL 453-54 (1993).
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Look around. Can't you see the tensions in Watts? Can't you feel
the fear in Scarsdale? Can't you sense the alienation in Simi Val-
ley? The despair in the South Bronx? The rage in Brooklyn?
We cannot play ostrich. Democracy cannot flourish amid fear.
Liberty cannot bloom amid hate. Justice cannot take root amid
rage. We must go against the prevailing wind. We must dissent
from the indifference. We must dissent from the apathy. We must
dissent from the fear, the hatred and the mistrust. We must dissent
from a government that has left its young without jobs, education or
hope. We must dissent from the poverty of vision and the absence
of moral leadership. We must dissent because America can do bet-
ter, because America has no choice but to do better .... Take a
chance, won't you? Knock down the fences that divide. Tear apart
the walls that imprison. Reach out; freedom lies just on the other
side.80
As he concluded, I saw a few tears trickle down the faces of peo-
ple, like me, who knew him well. We knew then that we may have
witnessed his last significant public appearance.
Then they wheeled him back on the forklift platform, and the
driver gently lowered him down in the wheelchair. When the event
was over, I walked over to the forklift driver and said, "Thank you."
He said, "Judge, it's the most important thing I have ever done in my
life."
Six months later, I am at the Supreme Court to pay my last re-
spects to my hero. On January 24, 1993, Thurgood died. My wife and
I could have used my judicial privilege to go in through the side door,
view him, and leave. Some judges took advantage of that option. But
Evelyn and I went to the end of the line, and for two-and-a-half or
three hours, we waited for the opportunity to observe him. A book
called The Supreme Court Justices, recently published by the Supreme
Court Historical Society, says: "Marshall died of heart failure ....
Thousands-all ages, all races-spent hours waiting in the cold to
show their respect to this hero as he lay in state in the Supreme Court.
Thousands more came the next day to the National Cathedral to
honor him .... " 8 1 It then describes how warmly he was eulogized.
One aspect of the Supreme Court's viewing that I remember par-
ticularly clearly was that in front of me were two men, inadequately
dressed for cold weather. One was blind. The other man said to the
person who was blind, "The casket is closed." He started to describe
the picture of Thurgood above the casket, and the flowers and other
80. Id.
81. Susan Low Bloch, Thurgood Marshall, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 476,488
(Claire Cushman ed., 1993).
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mementos people had placed there. As he described the scene, he
also mentioned what Thurgood stood for to minorities and poor peo-
ple, and the blind man said, "I see." You can't imagine what an emo-
tional impact these two people, in tattered clothing, had on me.
Then, some months later, I am again at the Supreme Court.
Drew Days, the Solicitor General of the United States, is presenting
the resolution to the Supreme Court honoring Thurgood Marshall. It
was a resolution that Karen Hastie Williams, I, and a few others, as
members of a Supreme Court Bar Committee, had prepared.82 At
that time, Justice Thomas was sitting on the Court. As I looked at
Justice Thomas, I thought of Hudson v. McMillian and a series of
other cases that he had participated in since Justice Marshall resigned.
It was absolutely wrenching to hear that resolution read to the Court,
and at the same time see Justice Thomas on that Court as Justice Mar-
shall's successor. I kept saying to myself, "Look, the tension is not
mine alone; many others present also viewed Justice Marshall as their
mentor, the nation's friend, and the people's advocate." Then, in
some curious way, my mind wandered to reflect on the recently re-
leased The Supreme Court Justices.83 It describes all of the 106 Jus-
tices, and it includes pictures. It shows Thurgood Marshall on
significant cases that he argued, including the Brown case. And it in-
cludes a great picture of him when he was sworn in.
For Justice Thomas, they chose one picture that is relevant to my
analysis. I suppose the editors were trying to think of what Justice
Thomas would be most famous for when the high court of history
writes a judgment about him. In this biography on Supreme Court
Justices, in the section on Justice Thomas, there is a picture of a Loui-
siana prison cell.84 The caption describes a Louisiana prison inmate,
beaten by guards while he was handcuffed and shackled. It notes that
Justice Thomas dissented from the majority decision that ruled in
favor of the prisoner. As my mind reflected on these ironies, the pain
that I thought I had gotten rid of was haunting me again. Think of it:
Objective biographers for the Supreme Court Historical Society have
chosen for Thurgood Marshall pictures of him opening the doors for
everyone, such as his advocacy in the Brown case; in that same vol-
ume, they have provided a picture of Justice Thomas slamming the
door of justice so that, had his views prevailed in Hudson v. McMil-
82. See RESOLUTION, supra note 9.
83. See supra note 81.
84. Id. at 530.
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lian, the weak and impotent, cruelly beaten prisoner would not be
able to get relief in a federal court as a matter of constitutional law.
After the Hudson case, I knew that it would be futile for anyone
to write another open letter to Justice Thomas, asking him to be fair.
In the future, I will merely describe some of his other decisions and
votes that are just as inhumane as was his dissent in the Hudson case.
Let me close with what I pray that Justice Clarence Thomas will
someday understand. This is a message that all of us must understand,
academician or unlearned, Black or White, Jew or Gentile, rich or
poor. It is a poem written by Langston Hughes, the great poet, who
happened to be Black. He wrote:
DREAM OF FREEDOM
There's a dream in the land
With its back against the wall.
By muddled names and strange
Sometimes the dream is called.
There are those who claim
This dream for theirs alone-
A sin for which, we know,
They must atone.
Unless shared in common
Like sunlight and like air,
The dream will die for lack
Of substance anywhere.
The dream knows no frontier or tongue,
The dream no class or race.
The dream cannot be kept secure
In any one locked place.
This dream today embattled,
With its back against the wall-
To save the dream for one
It must be saved for ALL.85
85. LANGSTON HUGHES, Dream of Freedom, in GOOD MORNING REVOLUTION: UN-
COLLECTED WRMNGS OF SOCIAL PROTEST BY LANGSTON HUGHES 170 (Faith Berry ed.,
1992).
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